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Abstract
In this paper we define a metric for reciprocity—the degree of balance in a social relationship—appropriate for weighted
social networks in order to investigate the distribution of this dyadic feature in a large-scale system built from trace-logs
of over a billion cell-phone communication events across millions of actors. We find that dyadic relations in this network
are characterized by much larger degrees of imbalance than we would expect if persons kept only those relationships
that exhibited close to full reciprocity. We point to two structural features of human communication behavior and
relationship formation—the division of contacts into strong and weak ties and the tendency to form relationships with
similar others—that either help or hinder the ability of persons to obtain communicative balance in their relationships.
We examine the extent to which deviations from reciprocity in the observed network are partially traceable to these
characteristics.
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1. Introduction
Reciprocity has been recognized to be one of the
most important properties of the connections linking en-
tities in networked systems (Garlaschelli and Loffredo,
2004; Boccaletti et al., 2006; Wasserman and Faust, 1994;
Zamora-Lo´pez et al., 2008; Skvoretz and Agneessens,
2007). The study of dyadic reciprocity began in the so-
ciometric and social network analysis tradition as a way
to characterize the relative behavioral or cognitive “bal-
ance” in social relationships (Hallinan, 1978; Hallinan
and Hutchins, 1980; Hammer, 1985; Davis, 1963; Man-
del, 2000; Krackhardt, 1987; Newcomb, 1968). These
studies defined reciprocity in a very simple—but funda-
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mentally limited—way. A dyad was reciprocal if both
partners nominated one another as friends, or—in the
tradition of “balance theory” (Heider, 1958; Newcomb,
1961, 1979; Davis, 1979; Doreian, 2002)—if it was found
that the relationship had the same valence (positive or neg-
ative) for both participants. Dyads were viewed as non-
reciprocal either when one partner reported considering
the other one a friend or a close associate and the other
did not, or if one partner displayed positive sentiments to-
wards a partner who felt negatively towards him or her.
The fundamental hypothesis of balance concerned a dy-
namic prediction: over time ties that were imbalanced
were expected either to become balanced or to dissolve
(Hallinan, 1978; Newcomb, 1961, 1979; Doreian, 2002).
This definition of “reciprocity” fit very well with the
representation of social networks in early graph theory
as consisting of binary (1,0) edges connecting two nodes
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Analysts can then establish
the level of reciprocity in the network via the so-called
“dyadic census.” This presupposes a binary adjacency
matrix A, where ai j = 1 if actor i chooses actor j as a
neighbor and ai j = 0 otherwise. Three types of dyads
can then be defined: asymmetrical—sometimes also re-
ferred to as “non-reciprocal” (ai j = 1 and a ji = 0 or
ai j = 0 and a ji = 1), symmetrical (ai j = a ji = 1) and null
(ai j = a ji = 0), otherwise known as the UMAN classifi-
cation (Carley and Krackhardt, 1996). The phenomenon
of dyadic reciprocity at the level of the whole network
has been studied by comparing the relative distribution of
asymmetric and mutual dyads in a graph (Mandel, 2000;
Garlaschelli and Loffredo, 2004). We can consider levels
of non-reciprocity to be high if the proportion of asym-
metric dyads is larger than would be obtained by chance
in a graph with similar topological properties (for instance
a graph with the same number of nodes and edges). This
traditional definition of reciprocity has been extended and
developed for the analysis of reciprocity in complex sys-
tems (social, technological, biological, etc.) organized as
networks (Garlaschelli and Loffredo, 2004).
The binary classification of dyads into three types
misses one of the most important features of a dyadic re-
lationship: the relative frequency of contact between the
two partners (Hammer, 1985; Eagle et al., 2008, 2009).
This is a dimension of dyadic relationships that has al-
ways been considered crucial in previous treatments of the
dynamics and static correlates of dyadic ties (Hammer,
1985; Marsden and Campbell, 1984; Feld, 1981; Peay,
1980), but which has not been treated in depth in the
existing literature, mainly due to lack of reliable behav-
ioral data on repeated social interactions among humans
in natural environments (Eagle et al., 2008). Furthermore,
it should also be clear that our intuitive notions of what
reciprocity is requires information about the relative “bal-
ance” not of static mutual nominations or sentiments, but
of repeated behavioral interactions, exchanges or flows in
a dyad (Wellman and Wortley, 1990; Borgatti, 2005; Bor-
gatti et al., 2009). This means that a more empirically
accurate definition of reciprocity can only be obtained in
the context of a weighted graph (Barrat et al., 2004; Yook
et al., 2001; Kossinets and Watts, 2006)—also referred
to as “valued graphs” (Peay, 1980; Freeman et al., 1991;
Yang and Knoke, 2001). In this representation, instead of
a tie being thought of as simply being present or absent,
the adjacency matrix is now defined by weights (ai j = wi j)
which indicate the relative flow strength of the arc (e.g.,
the count of the number of interactions initiated by i and
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(a) Reciprocity as a result of outdegree matching (b) Non reciprocity as a result of outdegree-
mismatch.
(c) Non-reciprocity as a result of directed weight-mismatch.
Figure 1: Idealized local-structural scenarios producing different levels of dyadic reciprocity.
directed towards j).
In this context, what have traditionally been consid-
ered “non-reciprocal” dyads—e.g., one partner in the
dyads nominates the other but not vice-versa—(Carley
and Krackhardt, 1996) can be better thought of as the
one-way, that is, completely unbalanced limit of the in-
teractions between the agents forming the dyad. This is
the case in which one partner in the relationship initiates
all contact attempts and receives no reciprocation from
the other member of the dyad. Intuitively it is doubtful
whether we can call this a relationship in the first place.
In the very same way, what have been traditionally con-
ceived of as “reciprocal” (e.g. “mutual” or “symmetric”)
dyads can exhibit high levels of communicative imbalance
with most of the interaction being one-way. Consider for
instance a dyadic relationship in which one partner is five
times more likely to direct a communication towards the
other person than the reverse. It is not very intuitive to
call this dyad “reciprocal,” but that is precisely what mea-
surements methods that discard the information encoded
in the weights do.
In sum, advancing research on dyadic reciprocity re-
quires that we define dyadic reciprocity for weighted
graphs. In this paper we do that (section 2), while offering
an empirical account of the distribution and correlates of
dyadic reciprocity in a weighted social network built from
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trace logs of cell phone communications (section 3). Fi-
nally, we compare (section 3.3) the observed distribution
to that obtained when we vary key dimensions of the net-
works that we argue are important topological and struc-
tural drivers of reciprocity. We close by outlining the im-
plications of our argument and results (section 4).
2. Weighted reciprocity
2.1. Weighted reciprocity metric
We seek to define a measure of dyadic reciprocity that
captures the degree of communicative imbalance a two-
way relationship between two actors. Consistent with the
notion of reciprocity as balance, this measure should have
the following properties: first, it should be at a minimum
when the weight of the directed arc going from vertex
i to vertex j approaches the weight of the directed arc
going from vertex j to vertex i. Second, it should in-
crease monotonically with the weight difference between
the two directed arcs. Third, it should normalize the
weight difference to adjust for the fact that some persons
are simply more communicative than others (they contact
all of their partners more or less frequently). Finally, the
measure should be the same irrespective of directionality
(Ri j = R ji).
One measure that satisfies these conditions is:
Ri j = |ln(pi j) − ln(p ji)| (1)
With,
pi j =
wi j
wi+
(2)
Where wi j is the raw weight corresponding to the di-
rected i → j arc, and wi+ is the strength of the ith vertex
as given by Barrat et al. (2004):
wi+ =
∑
j∈N(i)
wi j (3)
Where N(i) is the set of vertices that lie in i’s neigh-
borhood (i.e. are connected to i via an outgoing directed
arc). In the case of a social network where the weights
are given by the number of communications directed from
one actor to another, the strength of each vertex (w.+) can
be defined as the actors communicative propensity. This
is the likelihood that at any given moment a given actor
will be active or “on”, which in our case means being
the initiator of a communication event. We should expect
that in human communication networks there should exist
substantial heterogeneity across vertices in communica-
tive propensity—with some persons being constantly ac-
tive, and others communicating more sparingly—which is
a phenomenon that is characteristic of other physical and
biological systems (Barrat et al., 2004; Barthelemy et al.,
2003; Serrano et al., 2009).
Note that the “normalized weight” pi j (Serrano et al.,
2009) is the instantaneous probability that if i makes a
communication attempt it will be directed towards j (and
viceversa for p ji); as a probability their sum across j ∈
N(i) is constrained to be 1. A substantive interpretation
of a reciprocity measure based on the ratio of normal-
ized weights is that a dyad is reciprocal when two per-
sons have the same probability of communicating with
one another, and a dyad is non-reciprocal when the prob-
ability of one person directing a communication towards
another differs substantially from the probability of that
person returning that communication (In the following we
will just simply call Ri j our “reciprocity” measure with
the caveat that it really stands for the amount of imbal-
ance or non-reciprocity characterizing the dyad). Factors
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that affect this probability, such as the number of neigh-
bors connected to each vertex, the relative communica-
tive propensities of each vertex or the dispersion of edge-
weights across neighbors for each vertex, should thus be
implicated in moving each dyad closer or farther away
from the ideal of full reciprocity. Observe that in the limit
if one actor initiates all directed communication attempts
while the other actors initiates none, then reciprocity is not
defined (Ri j = ∞), which is consistent with the intuition
that there can be no definition of reciprocity when there is
no actual two-way relationship to speak of.
2.2. Some special cases
The characterization of reciprocity given above allows
us to outline some idealized conditions under which we
should expect full reciprocity and under which we should
expect systematic deviations from the reciprocity ideal.
To build some intuition it helps to rewrite equation 1 as:
Ri j =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ln
[
wi j
w ji
w j+
wi+
]∣∣∣∣∣∣ (4)
The first idealized condition that we can consider is an
equidispersion regime (Serrano et al., 2009; Barthe´lemy
et al., 2005). Under this condition, persons distribute their
communicative activity equally across partners, with the
only constraint being the number of partners (kouti ) and
their communicative propensity (wi+). It is easy to appre-
ciate that under this regime the expected directed weights
are given by:
ŵi j =
wi+
kouti
(5)
Substituting 5 into 2 we find that the expected pi j under
this regime is simply:
p̂i j =
1
kouti
(6)
Indicating a strong trade-off between the normalized
outflow and the range of contacts for each vertex (Aral and
Van Alstyne, 2009). Finally, substituting 6 into 1 shows
that in this case the reciprocity equation simplifies to:
R̂i j = |ln(koutj ) − ln(kouti )| (7)
Because vertex strength (w.+) drops out of the pic-
ture under the equidispersion constraint, if persons dis-
perse their calls equally across neighbors, and have the
same number of outgoing arcs (kouti = k
out
j ), then reci-
procity is assured. This is the situation depicted in Fig-
ure 1a. Thus, when equidispersion holds, deviations from
the reciprocity ideal are solely traceable to the magnitude
of the degree-differences across the two vertices in a dyad
and are independent of vertex strength differences.
A case of non-reciprocity produced by non-assortative
mixing by degree is shown in Figure 1b. Here the two ver-
tices match in strength but differ in outdegree. In this case,
even if the two actors were to distribute their communica-
tive activity equally across neighbors they would not be
able to reach reciprocity. The reason for this is that the
more sociable green vertex is forced to divide her energy
over a larger number of neighbors than the red vertex, re-
ducing the outgoing probability of communication in rela-
tion to the incoming probability corresponding to her less
sociable neighbor (Aral and Van Alstyne, 2009). This im-
plies that, holding all else equal, degree-assortativity in
social networks (the existence of more same-degree dyads
than we would expect by chance) should drive the aver-
age reciprocity of a random dyad towards the maximum
reciprocity point (Ri j = 0). Non-assortativity (or negative
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Figure 2: Distribution of reciprocity scores across dyads in the cell phone network. For each edge connecting two vertices, the
reciprocity score (R) is given by the absolute value of the logged-ratio of the normalized weights (pi j = wi j/wi+) corresponding to
each directional arc: Ri j = R ji = |ln(pi j/p ji)|. R = 0 indicates full reciprocity.
assortativity) should move dyads towards less reciprocal
relations.
As shown in Figure 1c, deviations from the ideal of
reciprocity can be produced even when persons share the
same number of neighbors and have the same communica-
tive propensities but they do not distribute their commu-
nicative activity equally across contacts. In the example
shown above, the green vertex follows the equidispersion
rule but the red vertex does not. Instead the red vertex con-
centrates her communicative activity on the green vertex
at the expense of her other neighbors. Setting wi+ = w j+
in 4, gives us the expected reciprocity for this case:
Ri j = |ln(wi j) − ln(w ji)| (8)
In other words, when vertices have the same strength
and have the same number of neighbors, but Ri j , 0, we
can be sure that either: (1) at least one of the vertices is
investing more in that relationship than in his or her other
relationships; or (2) at least one of the vertices is investing
in that relationship less than he or she does in his other
relationships. Naturally, both things could be happening
at the same time (one partner under-invests while the other
one over-invests).
A fourth case that would produce systematic non-
reciprocity according to 4 would be one in which the di-
rected weights for each arc in the dyad match (wi j = w ji),
but the vertex strength of the partners is different. In this
case, the level of non-reciprocity for that dyad is given by:
Ri j = |ln(w j+) − ln(wi+)| (9)
Note that the case of equal weight but non-equal ver-
tex strength is redundant since it is implies that either
one partner is under-investing or another partner is over-
investing in the relationship; this is therefore another ver-
sion of the non-equidispersion story shown in 1c. This is
intuitive since, as we saw above, when both vertices dis-
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Table 1: Four variants of weighted reciprocity: (1) quantity computed in a network with assortative mixing by degree and equal
flow dispersion (R̂obsi j ); (2) quantity computed in a network with a neutral mixing pattern and equal flow dispersion (R̂
rw
i j ; (3) quantity
computed in a network with assortative mixing by degree and unequal flow dispersion (Robsi j );(4) ) quantity computed in a network
with a neutral mixing pattern and equal flow dispersion ( Rrwi j ).
Assortativity Non-assortativity
Equidispersion R̂obsi j R̂
rw
i j
Non-equidispersion Robsi j R
rw
i j
perse their communicative activity equally across neigh-
bors Ri j, is independent of vertex strength differences.
Thus, any dependence of the expected value of Ri j on ei-
ther wi+ or w j+ when wi j = w ji can only be produced by
deviations from equidispersion.
In a real communication network, we should expect the
values of wi j to vary across neighbors for each vertex:
equidispersion is an ideal that will usually fail to be met
in real social networks (Almaas et al., 2004; Barthelemy
et al., 2003). Empirical evidence indicates that persons
typically divide their neighborhood into core and periph-
eral members, directing strong (large weight) ties toward
core members and keeping only weak (small weight) ties
with peripheral members (Granovetter, 1973; Marsden,
1987). Arcs that are considered strong ties in ego’s neigh-
borhood should have much larger weights than those that
are considered weak ties. Non-reciprocity results when
they are mismatches in the directional tie strength between
two vertices: one member of the dyad considers a strong
tie what from the point of the view of the other member is
a weak tie. Thus, holding all else equal, deviations from
the equidispersion ideal should move the average dyad
away from the reciprocity point (Ri j = 0).
3. The empirical distribution of weighted reciprocity
The data that we will consider in what follows con-
sist of a weighted graph of a human communication net-
work constructed from trace-logs of over 1 billion cellular
telephone voice calls made by 8 million subscribers of a
single cellular telephone provided in a European country
over a two-month period in 2008. Among these 8 million
subscribers there are over 34 million directed arcs, that is
instances in which a subscriber made at least one call to
the other subscriber. Of these 34 million arcs, about 16.8
million (49%) are asymmetric dyads, meaning that the di-
rected arc is not reciprocated. The remaining 17.2 million
symmetric arcs are in 8.6 million mutual dyads consisting
of two arcs, indicating that each person in the dyad made
at least to the other person during this time period. The
focus below is on these 8.6 million mutual dyads given
that reciprocity is only defined for these types of dyads.
We define the weight (wi j) of the incoming and outgoing
arcs for each vertex as the number of calls either received
from or made to each neighbor (respectively) during the
time period in question.
Figure 2 depicts the observed distribution of reci-
procity computed according to equation 1. We divide the
observed dyads into three classes: reciprocal dyads are
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Figure 3: Distribution of non-equidispersion scores across vertices in the cell-phone network. For each vertex, non-equidispersion
is given by H =
∑
j p2i j (Serrano et al., 2009), which is equivalent to Herfindahl’s (1950) concentration index. We normalize this
measure to remove any dependence between the expected minimum and vertex degree by computing H∗ = H−1/k
out
i
1−1/kouti . A score of one
indicates maximum concentration of communicative activity on one neighbor, a score of zero indicates equidispersion.
those in which the communication probability ratio (tak-
ing the largest probability as the numerator) ranges from
1.0 to 1.5 ( (0 to .41 when taking the natural log of the
probability ratio). Partially reciprocal dyads are those in
which the communication probability ratio is larger than
1.5 but smaller than 9.0 (.41 to 2.20 on the logged scale).
Finally, non-reciprocal dyads are those with a probability
ratio exceeding 9.0 (2.20 on the logged scale). We find
that a substantial minority (28%) of dyads belong to the
reciprocal class, about 58% of dyads can be considered
partially reciprocal, and a non-trivial minority of dyads
(14%) exhibit extreme non-reciprocity, with one partner
being more than nine times more likely to contact the
other than being contacted by that partner.
It is clear that a substantial proportion of dyads in the
observed social network feature relatively large degrees
of weighted non-reciprocity. Had we confined ourselves
to the purely binary definition of reciprocity as mutual-
ity or symmetry, we would have missed the large lev-
els of communicative imbalance encoded in the directed
weights. This result suggests that there are systematic fea-
tures of human communicative behavior that drive dyads
towards non-reciprocity in spite of often noted psycholog-
ical preferences and normative expectations for balance in
human social relationships (Gouldner, 1960; Newcomb,
1979; Hammer, 1985). We investigate some of the topo-
logical and structural factors that push social networks ei-
ther towards and away from reciprocity in what follows.
3.1. Comparing the observed distribution to alternative
regimes
To what extent are the patterns of reciprocity observed
in this social network deviations from what we would
expect by chance? To answer this question we com-
pare the observed reciprocity distribution to that obtained
from three-alternative regimes, corresponding to three out
of the four different configurations in a two-dimensional
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space defined by the presence or absence of degree as-
sortativity (Park and Newman, 2003; Newman and Park,
2003; Newman, 2003, 2002; Catanzaro et al., 2004), ver-
sus the presence or absence of a tendency toward equidis-
persion in the weight distribution of the arcs emanating
from each vertex (Barthe´lemy et al., 2005; Barthelemy
et al., 2003; Serrano et al., 2009). This is shown in shown
in Table 1.
As we have already noted, the observed social net-
work is located in the lower-left corner of the table (Robsi j ).
This is a network displaying positive degree assortativ-
ity and a tendency for non-negligible proportion of ac-
tors to distribute their communicative activity inequitably
across neighbors. The Pearson correlation coefficient (r)
between the (excess) degree sequences of each of the two
vertices across linked dyads in the observed network is
positive: robskik j = 0.33, which is a value typical for hu-
man social networks (Newman and Park, 2003). In ad-
dition, as shown in Figure 3, in the social network that
we examine—a substantial number of vertices (among
those whose kouti ≥ 2) concentrate their communica-
tive outflow on a minority of their contacts, generating
non-equidispersion of weights across the arcs directed at
their neighbors. In the observed communication network,
about 10% of vertices have an non-equidispersion score of
0.66 or above (with 1.0 indicating the extreme case of con-
centrating all communicative activity on a single partner)
and 25% have a score of .43 or higher. Only about 25% of
actors come close to the equidispersion ideal (H∗ ≤ 0.10).
The systematic prevalence of substantial inequalities in di-
rected weights across vertices is a property that this so-
cial system shares with other physical and biological net-
worked structures (e.g. Almaas et al., 2004; Barthelemy
et al., 2003; Csermely, 2004, 2006).
3.2. Procedure
We proceed to generate three alternative comparison
networks, all of which preserve the most relevant topo-
logical and statistical features of the original network
(number of vertices the number of links and the degree-
distribution), but which either remove assortativity, im-
pose equidispersion in the distribution of directed weights
across neighbors for all vertices, or do both. We remove
assortativity in the original network using the Maslov-
Sneppen local rewiring algorithm (Maslov and Sneppen,
2002; Maslov et al., 2004) illustrated in Figures 4a and
4b. It is easy to verify that this procedure preserves the
number of edges attached to each vertex, but makes the
vertex-to-vertex connections independent of degree. We
can verify that the algorithm is successful by computing
the degree-correlation after reshuffling. The resulting net-
work is indeed non-assortative (rrwkik j = 0) indicative of a
“neutral” mixing pattern.
Accordingly, the assortative-equidispersed network
(upper-left corner) is just like the originally observed net-
work, except that now the number of calls across part-
ners are redistributed and forced to be same (pi j = 1/kouti
for all arcs and Ri j = R ji = |ln(koutj /kouti )| for all dyads);
here reciprocity is given by R̂obsi j ). The non-assortative,
equidispersed network (upper-right corner of table 1) is
just like this last network, except that now the links are
reshuffled to remove degree-assortativity according to the
procedure described above; here reciprocity is given by
R̂rwi j ). Finally, the non-assortative non-equidispersed net-
work (lower-right hand corner) is just like this last net-
work, except that the distribution of calls across neigh-
bors matches that of the original data set; here reciprocity
9
(a) Local configuration before rewiring (b) Local configuration after rewiring
Figure 4: Schematic illustration of link-rewiring operation implemented in the Maslov-Sneppen algorithm.
is given by Rrwi j .
Because assortativity and non-equidispersion pull in
different directions with respect to reciprocity, we should
observe that R̂obsi j < R
obs
i j due to the non-equidispersion
effect; that is reciprocity in the observed network (where
there is non-equidispersion) is farther away from zero than
in a network with similar characteristics but where per-
sons distributed calls equally across partners. We should
also observe that Robsi j < R
rw
i j due to the assortativity ef-
fect; that is reciprocity in the observed network (which is
degree-assortative) is closer to zero than in a network with
the same characteristics because, as noted above, reci-
procity is more likely among dyads with degree similar
nodes. Finally, due to the non-equidispersion effect, we
should expect that R̂rwi j < R
rw
i j . That is even in a network
without assortativity, one in which persons distribute calls
equally across neighbors should have reciprocity values
closer to zero than one where this condition does not ob-
tain. If these three inequalities hold, then we should find
the following partial ordering of expected (average) non-
reciprocity across the four networks:
R̂obsi j < min
(
R̂rwi j ,R
obs
i j
)
≤ max
(
R̂rwi j ,R
obs
i j
)
< Rrwi j (10)
The most reciprocal network should be the one which
has both assortativity and equidispersion, and the least re-
ciprocal network should be one without assortativity and
without equidispersion. Note that the ordering of the ex-
pected values of R̂rwi j and R
obs
i j cannot be predicted a priori,
since the question of which force is greater, (1) the ability
of assortativity to drive reciprocity towards zero or (2) the
ability of non-equidispersion to move the same quantity
away from zero, is an empirical issue. We can however
expect that reciprocity in these two networks should fall
in between the two extremes described above, since they
are positive in a factor that lowers reciprocity and negative
on a factor that increases it. If assortativity is a stronger
factor in driving non-reciprocity towards zero than non-
equidispersion is in driving it away from zero, then we
should find that R̂rwi j > R
obs
i j . If the opposite is the case,
then we should find that R̂rwi j < R
obs
i j .
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Figure 5: Distribution of dyadic reciprocity in the observed cell phone network and three artificial variations. Blue
bars are reciprocal dyads, red bars are partially reciprocal dyads and green bars are non-reciprocal dyads as defined in
section 3 above.
3.3. Results
Figure 5 summarizes the differences in the relative dis-
tribution of reciprocity across all four networks. The re-
sults largely agree with expectations regarding the two
regimes that should fall at the lower and higher ex-
tremes of weighted reciprocity. Thus, the network with-
out assortativity and without equidispersion (Rrw) dis-
plays proportionally more dyads with extreme levels of
non-reciprocity. While only about 14% of dyads in the
observed network (Robs) exhibit extreme non-reciprocity
(e.g. one partner being nine times more likely to initiate
a communication attempt than than the other), this pro-
portion more than doubles once we remove the assortativ-
ity bias but keep everything the same (30%). Meanwhile
while about 28% of dyads enjoy some level of reciprocity
in the observed network, this number drops to 16% in
the non-assortative version of the same network. Also as
expected, the network displaying reciprocity values clos-
est to the zero (full reciprocity) level is the one that has
both assortativity and equidispersion. Here the propor-
tion of reciprocal dyads is 44% (in comparison to 28% in
the original data), and the proportion of extremely non-
reciprocal dyads is only 1%.
The results shown in figure 5 provide an answer to
the question of which of the two tendencies observed in
human communication networks—assortativity or non-
equidispersion—contributes more to system level reci-
procity. The answer is clear: adding equidispersion to the
least reciprocal network results in a much more dramatic
move towards reciprocity than does adding assortativity
to the same network (compare the difference between Rrw
and R̂obs to the difference between Rrw and Robs). In this
respect, while assortativity keeps human communication
networks from resembling the least reciprocal of our base-
line networks, the tendency to disperse communication
activity inequitably across contacts is responsible for the
bulk of the observed non-reciprocity.
Accordingly, the final ordering of expected reciprocity
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(with smaller values indicating more reciprocity) for all
the four networks is as follows:
R̂obsi j < R̂
rw
i j < R
obs
i j < R
rw
i j
4. Discussion
In this paper we have defined a metric for reciprocity
applicable to weighted networks. Under this conceptu-
alization, reciprocity is defined as balance in the number
of communications flowing from one partner to another,
normalized by the communicative activity of each person.
This yields a notion of reciprocity that is interpretable
as a matching of the probabilities that the two vertices
in a dyad will initiate directed contact attempts towards
each other. When persons match in overall communica-
tive propensity (w.+), reciprocity reduces to the (absolute
value of the logged) ratio of the weights of the incoming
and outgoing arcs. When the weights (wi j, w ji) of the arcs
are the same, reciprocity simplifies to the (absolute value
of the logged) ratio of the strength of the vertices. The
most revealing special case results when vertices disperse
their communication attempts equally across neighbors.
In this case reciprocity simplifies to the (absolute value of
the logged) ratio of the number of neighbors (outdegree)
of each vertex.
We examined the distribution of reciprocity as defined
here in a social network built from trace logs of cell-
phone communications between individuals during a two
month period. We found that these relationships exhibit
varying levels of balance, with the majority of relation-
ships exhibiting moderate to extreme large imbalances. In
this respect, while reciprocity might certainly be a com-
municative preference across persons, there are system-
atic features of human communication behavior and net-
work topology that prevent it from becoming a statistical
“norm” as would be predicted by cognitive balance and
normative theories of reciprocity (Heider, 1958; Gould-
ner, 1960; Newcomb, 1979; Hallinan, 1978). One such
feature consists precisely of the propensity to divide con-
tacts into strong and weak ties, thus concentrating com-
municative activity on a few partners at the expense of
others. As we have shown, eliminating this tendency—
by imposing equidispersion of weights on the observed
network—moves it closer to the ideal of full-reciprocity.
In addition, we demonstrate that one systematic feature
that differentiates social networks from other networks—
namely, the tendency of like to associate with like as mani-
fested in the degree-assortativity property (Park and New-
man, 2003)—makes the observed communication net-
work more reciprocal. Assortative mixing creates reci-
procity by facilitating the matching of probabilities across
incoming and outgoing arcs (see Figure 1). When we re-
move assortativity from the observed network, we observe
that non-reciprocity increases dramatically. It is worth
noting, however, that the effect of non-equidispersion in
moving reciprocity away from the ideal of zero is stronger
than the effect of assortativity in moving this quantity
closer to zero.
These results have important implications for how we
think about the phenomenon of dyadic reprocicity in so-
cial and other networked systems. For instance, smaller
groups or dense communities that impose homogeneity
in most topological characteristics (including the num-
ber of neighbors as in fully-connected cliques) should ex-
hibit more weighted reciprocity than social systems that
induce large inequalities in connectivity across partners
(e.g., social systems characterized by “popularity tour-
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nament” dynamics) (Martin, 2009; Waller, 1937; Gould,
2002; Barabasi and Albert, 1999). Networked systems
that induce anti-correlation in the number of neighbors
of each vertex in a dyad should—all else being equal—
be characterized by high-levels of non-reciprocity. In the
same way, positive correlations across vertices on other
relevant characteristics (e.g. average outgoing arc weight
or vertex strength) should move social relationships to-
wards the reciprocity ideal, while mismatches in these
vertex-level traits should increase non-reciprocity. In this
respect, observed tendencies for persons to match in these
traits may be the indirect result of an underlying tendency
to preserve more reciprocal relationships available in the
network and terminate the least reciprocal—biased selec-
tion into reciprocal relationships—than a direct prefer-
ence to be concordant on these surface features.
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